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MANDATORY ARBITRATION
Continued from page 1

Employing this type of analysis, which would take into
account an overworked, underfunded Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, backlogged court dockets and
other practical problems, my view is that most employees
might well be better off with mandatory arbitration, provided
that due process guarantees are in place and statutory remedies are available.

Due Process Concerns
The importance of due process issues was addressed in
the December 1994 Dunlop Commission Report on the
Future of Worker-Management Relations and in the May
1995 Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of
Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment
Relationship, developed jointly by a task force whose members included representatives of the American Bar
Association, the American Arbitration Association, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, the National Academy of Arbitrators,
the National Employment Lawyers Association and the
Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution. Both the
Dunlop Report and the Protocol contained closely parallel
standards for arbitrating employment disputes, including: (1)
a jointly selected arbitrator who knows the law; (2) simple,
adequate discovery; (3) cost-sharing to ensure arbitrator
neutrality; (4) representation by a person of the employee's
choice; (5) remedies equal to those provided by law; (6) an
opinion and an award, with reasons; and (7) judicial review
on the law.
The Dunlop Commission and the task force diverged on
the issue of mandatory arbitration of statutory claims, with
the Commission taking the view that the provisions of an
employment contract should not dictate how an employee's
statutory claim is enforced. The task force took no position
on the issue, although it agreed that mandatory arbitration
agreements as a condition of employment should be knowingly made.

Judicial Precedent
Court decisions on the arbitrability of statutory claims
under pre-dispute arbitration agreements have continued to
evolve, applying, sometimes differently, the two leading
Supreme Court cases: Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 1
(holding that an arbitrator's adverse decision under a collective bargaining agreement did not prevent a black employee
from pursuing Title VII claims of racial discrimination in a
discharge, because the arbitrator was authorized only to
decide the contractual issue, not the statutory issue), and
Gilmer v. Interstate!Johnson Lane Corp. 2 (holding that an individual stockbroker-employee was bound by a contract with
the New York Stock Exchange to arbitrate an Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claim against
his employer, reasoning that the arbitrator here was authorized to handle statutory as well as contractual disputes).

The Gilmer court emphatically endorsed arbitration as a
method of finally resolving disputes, even when the agreement to arbitrate is made as a condition of employment.
In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Lai,l the Ninth
Circuit refused to enforce an arbitration agreement of the
type upheld in Gilmer, after having concluded that the
employees did not "knowingly" waive their Title VII rights
and remedies. By contrast, in Austin v. Owens Brockway Glass
Container, 4 a divided Fourth Circuit held that a terminated
employee's gender and disability discrimination suit was
barred by the employee's failure to exhaust the arbitration
procedures in the union contract. Similarly, 'in Cole v. Burns
International Security Services, 5 Judge Harry Edwards, writing
for the D.C. Circuit, held that an employee could be
required to arbitrate Title VII racial discrimination claims
under a mandatory arbitration clause in an individual
employment contract, provided that the procedure was fair
and the employer paid all the arbitrator's fees. His decision
emphasized the difference between arbitration under an
individual contract, where the employee controls the presentation, and arbitration under a labor contract, where the
union is in control.
Judge Posner, writing for the Third Circuit in Pryner v.
Tractor Supply Co., 6 similarly distinguished arbitration clauses
in union contracts, holding that suits by former u~ion
employees alleging claims under Title VII, the ADEA and
the Americans With Disabilities Act, should not be stayed
because of the arbitration provisions in the collective bargaining agreements. He reasoned that Gardner-Denver controlled in the union context. Most recently, in Gibson v.
Neighborhood Health Clinics,' the Seventh Circuit held that a
former employee did not have to arbitrate Title VII and
ADEA claims against the employer since there was no consideration to support the employee's promise to arbitrate.
The court expressly declined to decide whether an employee's knowing and voluntary consent is a prerequisite to arbitrate statutory claims.

Administrative Agency Action
Separate from the court activity, the EEOC has recently
declared its opposition to mandatory binding arbitration as a
condition of employment. The National Academy of
Arbitrators also has recently denounced mandatory arbitration agreements imposed as a condition of employment that
require a waiver of access to the courts or an administrative
forum. (But the Academy added that in view of existing law,
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its members could serve as arbitrators
in such cases, provided that they
observe certain guidelines as to the
fairness of the proceeding.)
These principled concerns, however meritorious, do not take into
account some practical problems that
may make pre-dispute arbitration
agreements the only real answer for
most employees. For example, testimony presented to the Dunlop Commission indicated that employers may be
unwilling to enter into post-dispute
agreements to arbitrate except in the
case of very large claims, since they
usually prefer to wait out more "run of
the mill" claims, assuming most of
them will go nowhere.
Another issue is the difficulty of
obtaining legal representation. Many
lawyers will not invest their time in
statutory-discrimination court suits.
My informal survey indicated that
experienced lawyers accept only about
one out of every 100 potential discrimination claimants. The EEOC workload
and the court backlog present other
practical problems that must be considered. Before the EEOC began classifying cases in order of priority (and
tossed out many charges after only a
brief investigation), its backlog had
soared past 100,000 cases. Given these
realities, mandatory arbitration of
statutory claims under arbitration
agreements imposed as a condition of
employment, if accompanied by appropriate due process features, should not
be automatically rejected without further empirical study of the actual
effects on employee claimants.
•

Another rule permits the ICC
Court to authorize fewer than all of the
Continued from page 5
arbitrators to complete an arbitration
table it intends to follow. Although it when, after the close of proceedings, an
may be modified later, the schedule is arbitrator has died or otherwise been
intended to commit the tribunal removed from the panel. In deciding this
"morally" to a schedule from the outset. issue, the ICC Court will be required to
• Requiring the tribunal, upon the take account of relevant provisions of
closing of the proceedings, to indicate applicable law, such as laws prohibiting
to the secretariat of the ICC Court arbitrations to be conducted by an even
when it expects to submit a draft award number of arbitrators.
for scrutiny by that court.
The revised rules also add provisions relating to such subjects as the arbitrator's
authority to order interim
measures, the confidentiality of proceedings,
the assertion of new
claims, and the correction or interpretation
Some of the other key changes also of the award.
The new ICC rules will apply to
reduce delay and bring the rules into
alignment with current practice. For arbitrations commenced on or after
example, in multiparty cases a new Jan. 1, 1998, although parties who
provision gives the ICC Court the have included an ICC clause in their
power to appoint the tribunal if the contracts prior to that date may
parties cannot agree on a method of choose to be subject to the old rules in
appointment. There is a similar provi- the event an arbitration arises after
sion in the American Arbitration that date. If the parties cannot agree,
Association International Arbitration it will be up to the ICC to decide how
Rules and the rules of the World these disagreements should be
Intellectual Property Organization.
resolved.
•
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This article is adapted from the
author's keynote address presented at the
annual meeting of the American Bar
Association, Section of Labor and
Employment Law, on Aug. 4, 1997, at
the Grand Hyatt Hotel in San Francisco.
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